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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
In Re:
Walter E. Heller Western
Incorporated, a California
corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc.
a Utah corporation;
V. Ross Ekins; S. 0. Ekins;
et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES
Court of Appeals No. 880071-CA
Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, No. C83-2368
Supreme Court No. 860322

Dear Honorable Judges:
After the Respondent's Brief was filed herein the Utah
Court of Appeals has published a pertinent and significant
decision which bears on one of the central issues of this cause,
to-wit, the effect of impairment of collateral by the Lender on
the obligation of a Guarantor.
The referenced case is Valley Bank & Trust Company vs,
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., et al., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App.
1987), 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 66, filed September 1, 1987. A copy of
said case is appended hereto for the convenience of the Court.
The attention of the Court is directed to the portions
of said opinion setting out the rationale for release in the
event of impairment of security (see points 2,3, page 108), the
rule of construction of language of instruments drafted by the
Lender (point 4, page 110), and the effect under Utah law of such
impairment (point 5, page 110).
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February 23, 1988

Although the instant cause is governed by the law of
the state of California, the cited opinion is instructive in this
appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
. -.-^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^y
day of February,
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
John T. Anderson, Esq.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Appellant
50 West Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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rectly avoiding applicable United States Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., State v.
Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942, 947
(1982); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 876
(Alaska 1978); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii
361, 520 R 2d 51, 58 (1974); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, 616
(1975), cert denied 423 U.S. 878, 96 S.Ct.
152, 46 L.Ed.2d 111 (1976); O'Connor v.
Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979);
Stnte v. Brackman, 178 Mont 105, 682
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1978); Stnte v. Hunt, 91
NJ. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v.
Kock, 302 Or. 29, 725 P.2d 1286, 1287
(1986); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 896, 899
(R. 1.1980); State v. Opperman,
247
N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D.1976).
Justice Zimmerman recently criticized
the federal approach to warrantless
searches: "The federal law regarding warrantless searches and seizures has become
a labyrinth of rules built upon a series of
contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions." Hygh, 711 P.2d at
271-72 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); see
also State v. Johnson, 60 Utah Adv.Rep. 30,
33 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J. concurring).
While it is true that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Carney has
simplified the federal approach to the automobile exception under the fourth amendment, it has done so at the sacrifice of the
rights of the citizens of this nation to be
secure in their effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The warning
of Justice Jackson should be heeded:
[Fourth amendment rights] . . . are not
mere second-class rights but belong in
the catalog of indispensable freedoms.
Among deprivations of rights, none is so
effective in cowering a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and put
ting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled
search and seizure is one of the first and
most effective weapons in the arsenal of
every arbitrary government.
Brinegar t> U.S., 388 U.S. 160, 180, 69
S.Ct 1302, 1313, 98 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (Jack
son, J., dissenting).
Following many of her sister state
courts, the Utah Supreme Court may take

this opportunity to simplify Utah's vehicle
search and seizure law without gutting the
protection it provides to the citizens of this
state. See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1986). Warrantless vehicle searches
could be restricted to only those situations
where they serve their original purpose of
protecting police officers and preventing
the immediate destruction of evidence.
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).

(O
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VALLEY HANK AND TRUST COM PANY, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING,
INC.. a Utah corporation, Peter Lowe,
Jr., J. Randall Outsell, Tracy M. Jones,
Richard H. Lowe, and Don Bailey Construction, Inc., a Utah corporation, Defendants.
Peter LOWE. Jr., and Richard H. Lowe,
Cross-Complainants,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC..
a Utah corporation, Cross-Defendants
and Respondents,
and
Don Bailey, Draper Bank, a Utah corporation, and J acobsen-Robbing Construction Company, Inc., a Utah corporation. Third-Party Defendants.
No. 860018-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 1, 1987.
Creditor brought action to recover
against guarantors of obligation. The
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, Dean E. Conder, J., granted sum-
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mary judgment for creditor, and guarantors appealed
The Court, of Appeals,
Carff, J., held that; (1) whether bank had
control over collateral securing note guaranteed by guarantors, and in fact released
collateral, presented factual questions precluding summary judgment against absolute guarantors absent guarantors' express
consent to bank's impairment of collateral,
ami (2) award of attorney fees upon granting of summary judgment was improper.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Guaranty <*»42(1)
Guaranties given for business' debt
were unconditional, in that guarantors absolutely guaranteed payment and there
were no additional clauses stating express
or implied conditions on liability or contractual requirement that creditor seek satisfaction elsewhere on guaranty, and thus
guarantors' liability became fixed upon default of primary obligor.
2. Subrogation *»31(3)
Guarantor, whether absolute or conditional, has right of subrogation to any collateral pledged as security upon payment
of guaranteed obligation.
3. Guaranty <*=»607i
Where creditor's actions impair value
of collateral in its possession which secures
obligation guaranteed by guarantor, either
absolute or conditional, guarantor will be
discharged from his obligation to extent of
impairment, unless guarantor consents to
such impairment.
U.C.A.1963, 70A-36CHHI).
4. Guaranty *»72
Language in guaranty regarding guarantors' liability for any loans made to debtor, whether secured or unsecured, did not
explicitly waive guarantors' subrogation
rights to collateral, and thus did not constitute express consent by guarantors to
bank's impairment of collateral.
5. Judgment <*»181(22)
Whether bank had control over collateral securing note guaranteed by guarantors, and in fact released collateral,
presented factual questions precluding

summary judgment against absolute guarantors absent guarantors' express consent
to bank's impairment of collateral.
6. Costs <&*172
Award of attorney fees upon granting
of summary judgment in action on guaran
ty was improper where judgment was entered before guarantor had opportunity to
see and respond to creditor's affidavit on
attorney fees, and guarantors rebutted
creditor's affidavit.
Arthur H. Nielsen, Richard Hincks, Nielsen & Senior, Salt Lake City, for JacobsenRobbing Const. Co.
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for
Draper Hank and Trust.
Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for
Tracy Jones.
K.L. Mclff, Jackson, Mclff & Mower,
Richfield, for Peter M. Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. Lowe.
Paul D. Veasy, W. Jeffery Fillmore,
Biele, Haslam & Hatch, Salt Lake City, for
Valley Bank and Trust Co.
Before ORME, DAVIDSON and
GARFF, JJ.
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant* Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard
H. Lowe appeal from a summary judgment
in favor of plaintiff Valley Bank and Trust
(Bank) finding defendants liable as guarantors of a promissory note executed by Rite
Way Concrete Forming, inc. (Rite Way)
and awarding plaintiff attorney fees. We
remand for hearing consistent with this
opinion.
Rite Way executed a promissory note for
$16,000.00 at 12.76% interest per annum in
favor of the Bank for the purpose of purchasing concrete forming equipment from
Conesco, a concrete forming equipment
supplier. This note was secured by collateral consisting of the concrete forming
equipment and a 1977 Chevrolet two-ton
flat-bed truck, and by the personal guarantees of several persons, including Peter and
Richard Lowe.
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After execution of the note and the aecurity agreements, the I*owes conveyed all
of their interest in Rite Way to Don Bailey
Construction, Inc. (Bailey), which assumed
the $15,000.00 obligation to the Bank. In
connection with this transaction, Kite Way
transferred ownership of the flat-bed truck
and the cement forming equipment to Bailey, which subsequently subcontracted to do
work for Jacobsen-Robbins Construction
Co., a general contractor. Upon Bailey's
failure to satisfactorily complete the subcontract, it surrendered the secured equipment to Jacobsen-Robbins and defaulted on
the loan obligation to the Bank. Upon
Bailey's default, the Rank sued and entered
default judgment against it.
However,
Don Bailey, the corporate owner, disappeared and the corporation ceased doing
business without satisfying the debt.
The Bank then accelerated the note and
demanded that the Ix>wes pay the entire
balance of $4,494.71 because of their per
sonal guaranties. The l^owos refused to
pay the balance, but, instead, met with
Bank officers and offered to locate the
collateral and assist with its repossession.
They spent a considerable amount of time
and effort doing so, and allege that they
succeeded in locating virtually all of the
secured equipment on the Jacobsen Robbins job sites. They also assert that they
gave the Bank a specific description of the
equipment and its location, and authorized
the Bank to repossess it. For purposes of
reviewing this summary judgment, we review the facta and inferences in the light
most favorable to the Lowes. Allan Corp
v. Clows Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987).
Although the Bank never acquired actual
physical control over the collateral, it is
unclear whether it had the opportunity or
the right U> do so. On October 12, 1982,
without the l^owes' awareness or consent,
and reserving its righta against Rite Way, 1
the Bank released it* interest in the cement
forms in Jacobsen-Robbins' possession after Jacobsen-Robbins notified the Bank
that Conesco claimed ownership of the

forms.
Under the summary judgment
standard of review, we assume the truthfulness of the I .owes' statement that these
cement forms were substantially the same
equipment described in the security agreement
As a consequence of this release,
the Bank was unable to satisfy the loan
balance from the collateral.
The Bank brought a successful motion
for summary judgment against the Low en.
The trial court in a memorandum decision
found that the lx>wes' guaranty was absolute and unconditional because it provided
that the g u a r a n t o r s "severally
guarantee
payment
when due of any and all obligations of Borrowers to Bank when due or
any and all obligations of Borrower to
Bank now existing or which may hereafter
arise of whatsoever nature and however
represented, and whether secured or unsecured" (emphasis in original).
The trial court entered judgment in favor
of the Bank for $4,494 71 principal,
$1,884.78 interest, $2,800.00 attorneys'
fees, and $51.50 court costa.
The Lowes raise the following issues on
appeal. (1) In releasing the collateral, did
the Bank discharge the l^owes from their
guaranty agreements? (2) Was the award
of attorney fees against the Ixvwes improper?

The first issue
were discharged
agreements when
collateral securing

I.
is whether the Lowes
from their guaranty
the Bank released the
the loan.

Whether a creditor has a duty to pursue
the debtor or the collateral securing the
loan as a precondition to pursuing the
guarantor depends "on the nature of the
g u a r a n t o r ' s promise." Strevell
Paterson
Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 743 (Utah
1982) (quoting Westinghouse Credit Corp.
v. Hydrosunft
Corp., 628 R2d 156, 168
(Utah 1974)).
The nature of the guarantor's promise
depends upon whether it is absolute or

I. The Bank's release stated that "(b]y disclaimny does not release or waive any right under its
ing any interest in and to the forms set forth as
Security Interest and Financing Statement with
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark
Law School,
described herein. Valley Bank and Digitized
Trust Compa
Rite-Way
Concrete
Forming,
Inc.,
Debtor,
..." BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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conditional. An absolute guaranty is defined as:
a contract by which the guarantor has
promised that if the debtor does not perform his obligation or obligations, the
guarantor will perform some act (such us
the payment of money) to or for the
benefit of the creditor.... A guaranty of
the payment of an obligation, without
words of limitation or condition, is construed as an absolute or unconditional
guaranty.
88 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty § 21 (1968). This
unconditional obligation, sometimes referred to as a guaranty of payment, holds
the guarantor liable, without notice, upon
the default of the principal. Mack /Y/i.
Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho HM, 606 P.2d 998,
998 (1980). Such a guaranty is "absolute,
and the guaranteed party need not fix its
losses by pursuing its remedies against the
debtor or the security before proceeding
directly against the guarantor." StreveltPaterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d at 748.
On the other hand, a conditional guaranty, or guaranty of collection, is an obligation to pay or perforin if payment or
performance cannot be first reasonably obtained from the principal obligor, Id.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Strevell-Paterson, found that the guaranty contract at
issue was an absolute guaranty of payment
rather than a guaranty of collection, because it "contained no express or implied
condition on liability and no contractual
requirement that the creditor seek satisfaction elsewhere before commencing action
on the guarantee." Id. at 748-44.
[lj Likewise, the present guaranty contract contains language that indicates that
it is an absolute guaranty of payment rather than only a guaranty of collection:
"VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY," a corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Bank", has extended credit
and/or agreed to extend credit and/or
furnished or agreed to furnish other accomodations to the person hereinafter
identified as "Borrower", and the undersigned Guarantors, in consideration of
such credit and/or accomodations by
Bank to Borrower jointly and severally

&MM^

guarantee payment when due of any
and all obligations of Borrower to
Bank now existing or which may hereajler arise of whatsoever nature and
however represented, and whether secured or unsecured (emphasis added).
As in Strevell-Paterson, there are no
additional clauses stating an "express or
implied condition on liability," nor is there a
contractual requirement that the creditor
seek satisfaction elsewhere on the guaranty. See StnrvellPaterson, 646 P.2d at 744.
Therefore, tlie Lowes' liability for tlie loan
became fixed upon the default of the primary obligor, Don Bailey.
12,3 J However, a guarantor, upon payment of tlie guaranteed obligation, has a
right of subrogation to any collateral
pledged as security. Behlen Mjg. Co. v.
First National Bank, 28 Colo.App. 300,
472 P.2d 703, 706 (1970); D. W. Jaguays A
Co. v. ftrat Security Bank, 101 Ariz. 301,
419 P.2d 86, 89 (1966). This is true even of
an absolute guarantor. This right to subrogation is a "creature of equity," whose
"purpose is the prevention of injustice and
is the mode which equity adopts to compel
the ultimate payment of a debt by one who
ui justice, equity, and good conscience
ought to pay it." Behlen Mfg. Co., 472
P.2d at 707 (quoting D.W. Jaguays A Co.,
419 P.2d at 88). The rationale is that the
creditor, having elected to proceed against
security for payment of the debt, is deemed
to be in a trustee relationship with the
guarantor. The creditor may liquidate the
security and apply the proceeds to the obligation, or he may forego recourse to the
security and proceed against the guarantor
of payment, provided he does not subvert
tlie guarantor's subrogation rights against
collateral pledged by the principal obligor.
If he breaches that trust duty by destroying, losing, or otherwise improvidently dissipating the collateral, he may not hold tlie
guarantor wholly liable because the guarantor would have been subrogated to the
creditor's right of resort to that security.
38 AmJur.2d Guaranty
§ 84 (1968).
Thus, where a creditor's actions impair the
value of collateral in its possession which
secures an obligation guaranteed by a
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mrantor, either absolute or conditional,
e guarantor will be discharged from his
•ligation to the extent of the impairment,
ack Mn. Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d at 998.
This general rule has been codified in
tab through the Uniform Commercial
wie.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-316(1X1980) states:
The holder discharges any party to the
instrument to the extent that without
such party's consent the holder .. . (b)
unjustifiably impairs any collateral for
the instrument given by or on behalf of
the party or any person against whom he
has a right of recourse.
Appellants rely on this general rule to
ipport their argument that they should
icape liability on their guaranty contracts
'cause the Hank's release of the collateral
as unjustified.
However, as an exception to this general
ile, an absolute guarantor may explicitly
awe his rights against collateral Under
le language of Section 70A-8-606(l)(b),
le holder does not discharge a party to the
istrument if the party consents to allow
\e holder to impair the collateral. Thus, a
nding that the guarantors so consented
mders Section 3-606 discharge unavailtde even if the holder unjustifiably impairs
le collateral. The Official Comment to
pction !M>06 of the Uniform Commercial
ode indicates that such consent may be
iven in advance in the guaranty agreelent:
Consent may be given in advance, and is
commonly incoq>orated in the instrument. It requires no consideration, and
operates as a waiver of the consenting
party's right to claim his own discharge.
ee also National Acceptance Co. of
merica v. Demes, 446 F.Supp. 388, 390
1111.1977).
Such consent must be explicit and
should only be by the most unequivocal
tnguage in the guaranty agreement."
lehlen Mfg. Co., 472 P.2d at 708 (quoting

Utah
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II W. Jaquai/s <ir Co., 419 P.2d at 89); See
also Mack hn. Corp., 606 P.2d at 1000.
For example, an explicit contract was
found in Joe Heaston Tractor dr Implement Co. v Sec. Acceptance Corp., 248
F.2d 196, 198 n. 1 (10th Cir.1957):
The undersigned grants to the Finance
Company full power to modify or change
terms of any of the Liabilities, to agree
to forbearance with respect thereto, to
consent to the substitution or exchange
or release of collateral thereto, and extension of time of payment of the Liabilities.
Likewise, the guaranty agreement in National Acceptance Co. of America v.
Denies, 446 F.Supp. at 390, was found to be
an unequivocal waiver of rights against
collateral.
The undersigned hereby waive notice of
the following events or occurrences: . . .
the holder's obtaining, amending, substituting or releasing, waiving, or modifying any . . . security interests, liens, or
encumbrances; |or) . . . the holder's . . .
hereafter accepting .. . any collateral securing the payment . . . or said holder's
settling, subordinating, compromising,
discharging, or releasing the same. The
undersigned agree that the holder of the
Note may . do any or all of the foregoing events or occurrences in such manner, upon such terms and at such timers
as said holder, in its sole and absolute
discretion, deems advisable, without in
any way or respect impairing, affecting,
reducing, or releasing the undersigned
from their obligations hereunder....
Id. See also Schauss v. Garner, 690 P.2d
1816 (Wyo.1979).
In contrast, the court in Behlen MJg. Co.
found that language in the guaranty agreement * did not meet this test because "the
only waiver in the guaranty agreement
(had] to do with notice of nonpayment,
protest, extension of the note and partial
payment. There I was J no waiver relating
to the collateral. The indemnity agree-

connectlon with thr nhove nole, or in (he acThe specific provisions In the guaranty agree
ment were as follows: Behlen agreed "to fully
ceptance of any collateral therefor, or which
indemnify and save the Bank harmless against
may be incurred in enforcing collection of the
all expense, loss, damage or injury arising in
same
" Behlen Mfo. Co., 472 P.2d at 706.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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merit is limited to expense, loss or damage
incurred in accepting the collateral or incurred in enforcing collection." Id., 472
P.2d at 708, (emphasis added). See also
Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889,
606 P.2d 993, 1000 (1980).
Similarly, the Arizona court, in Jaquays,
found that guarantors' subrogation rights
were not impaired because consent to impair the collateral was not explicitly given,
stating that the following language was
insufficient to constitute an unequivocal
waiver of rights against the collateral:
"and in connection therewith consents without notice to any extensions or forbearance
by assignee, and waives any demand or
notice of default." Jaquays, 419 P.2d at
88.

Therefore, assuming the Bank had control over the collateral, as the Lowes contend, we conclude that it had a duty to
preserve the Lowes' interest in the property held as security and that performance of
this duty was not waived by the Lowes'
unconditional guaranties because the
Lowes did riot expressly consent to impairment of the collateral. See Jaquays, 419
P.2d at 89.

[6J Whether the Lowes can prevail,
however, depends upon two factors: If the
forms which the Lowes found were the
actual collateral and, if so, whether the
Hank had control over them.3 Further, a
guarantor is released from his liability only
to the extent of the injury caused by the
failure of the creditor to protect his securi[4] In the present case, there are no ty interest, if the creditor was in control of
explicit waivers of rights against collateral the property held as security. Utah Code
in the Lowes' guaranty agreements. The Ann. § 70A-3-606(l) (1980); see Jaquays,
only language which could be remotely con- 419 P.2d at 89; Mack FitL Corp. v. Scott,
strued to be a waiver of rights against 606 P.2d at 998.
collateral states that the Lowes "jointly
Since there are genuine issues of materiand severally guarantee payment when due
al fact as to whether the Bank had control
of any and all obligations of Borrower to
over the collateral and whether the forms
Hank now existing or which may hereafter
released by the Bank were, in fact, the
arise of whatsoever nature and however
collateral securing the note guaranteed by
represented, whether secured or unsethe Lowes, the summary judgment must be
cured."
set aside. Atlas, 737 P.2d at 229. This
In interpreting this language, we recog- conclusion renders any discussion concernnize that an instrument purporting to es- ing disposition of the collateral in a comtablish liability against a guarantor must mercially reasonable manner unnecessary.
be construed strictly, and any ambiguities
must be resolved against the drafter of the
II.
instrument. National Acceptance Co. of
The
second
issue
raised by appellants
America v. Denies, 440 F.Supp at 391.
was
whether
the
award
of $2,800 in attorThis present language deals with the guar
antors' liability for any loans made to the ney fees was proper. It is undisputed that4
debtor, whether secured or unsecured, not the Lowes were liable for attorney fees.
with any waiver relating to collateral. What is at issue is the amount of the fee.
Construed strictly against the Hank, it does
On February 24, 1984, Veasy, the Bank's
not explicitly waive any subrogation rights counsel, filed an affidavit in support of
to collateral.
attorney fees with the court, but failed to
3.

The Bank conceded, for purposes of this appeal only, thai it had such control. Our decision in no way precludes the Hank from proving
at trial that it, in fact, hud no such control.

4.

The relevant portion of the loan contract
states, "(a]II costs and expenses of Bank, in
retaking, holding, preparing for sale and selling
or otherwise realizing upon the collateral in the
event of default by Borrower, including court

costs and reasonable attorney's fees and legal
expenses, shall constitute additional indebtedness of the Borrower secured hereby which the
borrower promises to pay on demand." The
Guaranty agreement is in accord: "Each Guar
antor agrees to pay all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred tn
enforcing this agreement."

i&miiM&m'Mm^mM
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nerve a copy on Mclff, counsel for the
Lowes. Mclff received, on Feb. 27, 1984, a
copy of the proposed judgment from Veasy
which indicated that the Lowes were liable
for $2,800.00 in attorney fees. He called
Veasy that day to inform him of the lack of
affidavits or documentation supporting the
award of attorney fees and, on Feb. 28,
1984, filed an affidavit alleging that the
attorney fee award was excessive and the
supporting affidavit was not timely filed.
The trial court entered judgment on
March 6, 1984, for $4,494.71 principal,
$1,884.78 interest, $2,800.00 attorney fees,
and $61.60 court costs. Mclff stated that
he finally received a copy of the affidavit in
support of attorney fees on March 7, 1984,
and, on the same day, filed a motion in
opposition to plaintiff's affidavit in support
of attorney fees. On April 4, 1984, Mclff
filed an affidavit in which he brought these
facts again to the court's attention.
(61 The Utah Supreme Court has stated
that "(e|ven if there were no disputed issue
of material fact, the summary judgment
cannot award an attorney's fee without a
stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted
affidavit, or evidence given as to the value
thereof." Prted h\n. Co. v. Stoker Motor
Co., 637 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1976). In
the instant case, there was not only a lapse
of due process in that judgment was entered before appellant had an opportunity
to see and respond to respondent's affidavit on attorney fees, but appellants rebutted respondent's affidavit. Accordingly,
the award of attorney fees was improper.
Since the judgment appealed from is reversed, the award of attorney fees falls as
well, and fresh consideration of the attorney fee question will, of course, be appropriate.
Reversed and remanded for trial consistent with this opinion.

Elwood C. SHAFFER. Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860082-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 1, 1987.

Judgment creditors brought action to
reaffirm judgments, and defendant moved
for summary judgment on basis of statute
of limitations. The District Court, Salt
Lake County, Kenneth Kigtrup, J., determined that statute of limitations period was
tolled during defendant's absences from
state, and defendant appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (I)
except in proceedings brought under Nonresident Motorist Act, statute of limitations
periods are tolled during defendant's absences even though defendant was amenable to service of process, and (2) trial court
correctly calculated defendant's absences
from state for purpose of tolling statute of
limitations by excluding first day of period
and including last day.
Affirmed.

1. Limitation of Actions <*»84(2)
Statute of limitations for all actions
other than proceedings under Nonresident
Motorist Act are tolled during defendant's
absences, even though defendant is amenable to service of process within state.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 4.
2. Time «=»9(2)

In action to reaffirm judgments
against defendant, trial court correctly calculated defendant's absences from state
for purpose of tolling statute of limitations,
«IVNUNM»tVSTIM>
• * V V " ^ * M V *f
by excluding first day of period of defendDigitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
ant's
absence
but including
last Law
day.School,
U.C.BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. 1963, 68-3-7.

DAVIDSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
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